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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Over the past decade, the demands of the ADF’s global and regional operations saw an unprecedented growth in 
Australia’s special operations capability. Special operations forces (SOF) became the ‘capability of choice’ for the 
Australian Government, especially in more threatening environments such as Iraq and Afghanistan. SOF’s ability to 
conduct highly sensitive military missions (including combat and non-combat operations), to operate in complex 
terrain and to do so at short notice, made them a very attractive military instrument. As a result, Australia’s Special 
Operations Command (SOCOMD) received significant funding, grew in strength, and gained greater prominence in 
the ADF’s institutional structure. 
However, as the ADF enters into a period of transition from almost constant high-tempo operations to (potentially) 
a ‘soft power decade’, the future of Australia’s special operations capability is uncertain. ‘Operational fatigue’ on the 
part of government and nation, as well as a lack of immediate external drivers could lead to a diminished interest in 
special operations and thus less willingness to maintain the capability at its current level. This could be exacerbated 
by harsh fiscal realities and looming decisions on some prodigiously expensive defence acquisitions, such as future 
submarines, ships and fifth-generation fighter aircraft. 
In one sense, Australia’s SOF could become a victim of their own success. The public and the political establishment 
almost exclusively associate special operations with ‘kicking down doors’—despite the fact that this is only one 
element in a much broader operational continuum. There’s a high risk that these specialists are seen only as very 
good soldiers who can be sent to conduct conventional operations with a lower risk of casualties than the regular 
forces. As the need for such operations diminishes, the political establishment could lose interest in what is a 
relatively small but high-value ADF force element. 
Alternatively, the government could decide to selectively implement efficiencies in Defence and direct resources 
away from some force elements and towards others. For example, the special operations capability could be further 
upgraded relative to the regular Army, which might be cut as part of a ‘peace dividend’. With major maritime and 
air platform purchases to be paid for over the next decade, the land forces are most at risk of resource starvation. 
Prioritising the special operations capability could seem an attractive option for policymakers, given that SOF 
can be seen as relatively cost-effective. But that isn’t a workable strategy. The capabilities of regular Army are 
complementary to those of the SOF; these forces work best—indeed, can only work—as the top of a ‘pyramid’ of 
land forces that provides the personnel base and many of the required enabling force elements.
Against this background, this study aims to inform policy decisions by providing an understanding of the special 
operations capability and what it offers to government in both peace and wartime. At the same time, it’s equally 
important to consider what SOF can’t do—particularly since Australia’s SOF are fairly few in number. 
In the context of the Afghanistan operation, a widespread belief has developed that SOF are particularly well suited 
for high-intensity combat operations. However, while they’re certainly capable of conducting parts of this mission 
spectrum, such as tracking down insurgent group leaders, conventional combat operations have been the domain 
of the regular Army and should remain so. Indeed, SOF offer the best value in unconventional operations and in 
so-called ‘Phase Zero’ missions, which focus on building and shaping defence relationships with key partners in a 
pre-crisis environment. Since regional defence engagement will become more important for the ADF as a whole, 
SOF can make a significant contribution to this task.
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Consequently, any temptation to reduce the special operations capability as a cost-cutting measure should 
be resisted. Instead, it makes sense to consolidate the capability at current levels while further developing it, 
including as part of a joint force. This doesn’t necessarily mean giving SOCOMD more money, although its American 
counterparts did get a resource boost in the midst of general cutbacks across the services. However, the command 
should be provided with an ongoing funding line for specialised, small-scale capability projects. Given the 
specialised nature of the capability, SOCOMD itself is best placed to make small-scale investment decisions, to guide 
experimental work on developing future capability and to respond quickly to changing operational requirements. 
The appropriate funding should be in the order of $20–30 million per year. For larger projects, SOCOMD should 
compete with other proposals in the well-established defence capability process—although it could use a champion 
at the committee table to ensure that all of the enabling elements required for special operations, such as airlift, 
strategic communications and fire support, are in place when needed.
To that end, there’s a good case for a revision to Defence’s capability manager framework to include a capability 
Manager for Joint capabilities. The proposed role has application well beyond SOCOMD, and the new capability 
manager would have responsibility for ensuring that enabling and support capabilities required by all of the ADF’s 
specialised force elements (including SOCOMD) are appropriately managed and developed. The Vice Chief of the 
Defence Force (VCDF) would be the appropriate choice. In this model, the VCDF would ensure that ADF projects such 
as the future submarines and the amphibious capability consider special operations requirements, while the Chief 
of Army would retain the responsibility to raise, train and sustain the land forces, including SOF.
Apart from questions of how to fund and develop the special operations capability, the government should also 
seek to establish a legislative framework for the conduct and oversight of clandestine operations. Such 
operations share some similarities with sensitive intelligence operations, and potentially involve military personnel 
in ways other than uniformed and declared military operations. In an increasingly murky international environment 
involving well-resourced and dangerous non-state actors, clandestine operations could become a more important 
task for Australia’s SOF. If government decides to use the capability in this way, it’s important to develop an 
unambiguous legislative framework for such operations.
SOCOMD has a lot to offer in Defence’s regional engagement strategy. Some augmentation of its capacity to 
contribute to regional and (limited) global defence engagement would be a valuable investment. There’s a case for 
global engagement, and SOCOMD needs to have knowledge of allied and friendly country practices. That would 
be assisted through a SOCOMD presence in selected headquarters. Generally, though, Sof foreign engagement 
should prioritise Australia’s near region: that’s where our security interests are most closely engaged, and 
proximity would make it easier for other ADF elements to provide support for operations if required. 
Defence could consider establishing Sof liaison elements in selected Australian embassies, providing a 
permanent SOCOMD representation in key partner countries. In Southeast Asia, SOCOMD should consider 
establishing such elements in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, of which Indonesia is the most 
important. In the South Pacific, fostering SOF cooperation with Papua New Guinea and Fiji should be a priority.
Over time, increased SOF engagement with Southeast Asian nations could lead to the establishment of a regional 
Sof training centre. Defence could initiate this development and offer to host such a school in Australia to facilitate 
cooperation and coordination among regional SOF. The centre could also link into existing training centres beyond 
the Asia–Pacific region, such as NATO’s Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ).
Beyond regional engagement, maintaining and strengthening Sof cooperation with our US ally is vital for 
activities in the Asia–Pacific theatre and further abroad. Steps to strengthen the relationship could include 
intensifying bilateral training activities as well as establishing a small permanent SOF presence at two more US 
regional combatant commands. While an agreement was recently signed for a SOCOMD liaison post at US Pacific 
Command (USPACOM), similar arrangements could be considered with US Central Command (USCENTCOM) and US 
Africa Command (USAFRICOM) to facilitate Australian special operations in the Middle East and Africa.
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
During the past decade, Australia’s special operations forces (SOF) became the ‘capability of choice’ for successive 
governments. Their ability to conduct highly sensitive military missions (including combat and non-combat 
operations), to operate in complex terrain and to do so at short notice, made them a very attractive military 
instrument in the context of ADF missions in the greater Middle East and elsewhere. As a result, they experienced 
unprecedented financial and institutional growth. However, unless there’s an unforeseen major conflict, for the 
ADF the next decade will most likely be characterised by a greater emphasis on regional defence engagement and 
a much lower operational tempo. Consequently, the special operations capability is unlikely to be employed to the 
same degree for kinetic, high-intensity operations. However, that doesn’t necessarily make SOF less useful as a tool 
of Australia’s defence policy. In fact, what’s often overlooked in debates about SOF is that their utility is often even 
greater in so-called ‘Phase Zero’ roles, such as building and shaping defence relationships with key partners in a 
pre-crisis environment, than during war.1 
The Australian Government and the Defence Department need to think about the future role and shape of 
the special operations capability. Given the secrecy and myths surrounding their operations, SOF aren’t well 
understood inside and outside Defence. They don’t enjoy the broad institutional support of regular forces and are 
often regarded as competitors rather than critical enablers. Moreover, the political establishment and the public 
almost exclusively associate special operations with ‘finding, fixing and finishing’ high-value targets and ‘kicking 
down doors’, despite the fact that those tasks are only one element in a much broader operational continuum. Thus, 
the special operations capability could become a victim of its own success if these specialised operators are seen 
only as very good soldiers who can be sent to conduct conventional operations with a lower risk of casualties than 
the regular force. As the appetite for such operations diminishes, there’s a risk that the political establishment will 
lose interest in what is a small but high-value ADF force element. As well, while the Abbott government has pledged 
to grow the defence budget to 2% of GDP over the next decade, the reality—at least in the short term—is likely to be 
one of extended cost cutting.2 As the special operations capability vanishes from the political radar screen, it also 
might be subjected to cuts. 
The special operations capability is an important military 
option for the Australian Government, designed for 
missions that conventional forces can’t undertake...
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The consequences of such a decision, however, wouldn’t be trivial. The special operations capability is an important 
military option for the Australian Government, designed for missions that conventional forces can’t undertake, 
such as operating in a low-profile manner, behind enemy lines or in theatres where there are no lines at all, and 
in politically highly sensitive places. Moreover, it’s also a relatively cost-effective capability. SOCOMD currently 
comprises about 2,200 personnel, which is less than 8% of the Army’s total strength. Defence doesn’t currently 
provide detailed budget figures for special operations–specific expenditure but a fair estimate is that only a little 
over 1% of the current Defence Capability Plan (DCP) is devoted to this item. While regular Army, Navy and Air Force 
elements also contribute to special operations, money spent on the special operations capability remains a small 
fraction of overall defence spending. This reflects trends in allied countries such as the US, which, despite a much 
larger special operations posture and a much bigger budget, spent less than 2% of its total defence budget on this 
capability in fiscal year 2012.3 In times of fiscal austerity, the special operations capability offers the Australian 
Government a cost-effective tool to support national security objectives. Cuts, on the other hand, could easily 
disrupt what’s a fairly small and highly specialised capability. 
In times of fiscal austerity, the special operations 
capability offers the Australian Government a 
cost-effective tool to support national security objectives. 
Alternatively, the government could decide to strengthen the special operations capability and to downsize the 
regular Army as part of a ‘peace dividend’. With major maritime and air platform purchases to be paid for over the 
next decade, the land forces are most at risk of resource starvation. Prioritising the special operations capability 
could seem an attractive option for policymakers, given that the SOF can be seen as relatively cost-effective. But 
that isn’t a workable strategy. The capabilities of regular Army are complementary to those of the SOF; SOF work 
best—indeed can only work—as the top of a ‘pyramid’ of land forces that provides the personnel base and many of 
the required enabling force elements.
Against this background, this study looks at some key conceptual, operational and institutional challenges for 
SOF. It first provides a general framework by discussing the general roles of SOF as well as the evolution and 
current structure of Australia’s special operations capability. It then analyses the changes in the ADF’s operating 
environment and the implications for the capability. This is followed by a discussion of developments in allied SOF, 
given that Australia’s SOF predominantly work alongside allies and partners. The next section deals with ways to 
improve the development of capability specific to special operations. A section with specific recommendations for 
Australia’s future special operations capability concludes the analysis.
CHAPTER 2
Australia’s Special Operations Forces: who are they and what 
do they do?
The Australian Army’s definition of special operations is very generic. Accordingly, special operations are: 
… highly specialised and focused operations performed by specially selected, trained and prepared individuals 
and teams imbued with a creative mindset capable of producing solutions beyond conventional approaches 
… These activities are designed to achieve tailored operational, military and national strategic effects beyond 
those of conventional forces.4
While this definition stresses the importance of the human dimension of special operations (for example, the 
specific skill sets of special operations personnel to enable non-conventional military operations), it doesn’t 
say much else. A more comprehensive definition is provided by the US Joint Special Operations Doctrine, which 
describes special operations as:
… requiring unique modes of employment, tactical techniques, equipment and training often conducted in 
hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environment, and characterized by one or more of the following: time 
sensitive, clandestine, low visibility, conducted with and/or through indigenous forces, requiring regional 
expertise, and/or high degree of risk.5
Special operations thus cover a wide mission spectrum, which is typically divided into two analytical categories: a 
direct and an indirect approach. The US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines the direct approach as 
‘technologically enabled small-unit precision lethality, focused intelligence, and interagency cooperation integrated 
on a digitally networked battlefield’.6 Alternatively, the US Army uses the term ‘surgical strike’, which is somewhat 
broader and refers to:
… the execution of activities in a precise manner that employ special operations in hostile, denied or politically 
sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, exploit, recover or damage designated targets, or influence 
adversaries or threats.7
Practical examples include the hunting down of insurgency leaders in Afghanistan by allied SOF (including the 
Australian Special Operations Task Group, SOTG) or the rescue of Australian hostages overseas. For Australia’s SOF, 
three key missions could be subsumed under the label of the ‘direct approach’ of special operations:
•	 Special reconnaissance (Sr) operations are used for intelligence collection, including reconnaissance, 
surveillance and other techniques. They’re designed to obtain or verify information concerning the capabilities, 
intention and activities of an actual or potential enemy. They’re also used to secure information about 
meteorological, hydrographic or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
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•	 Precision strike / direct action (PS/DA) operations typically include short-duration strikes and other 
small-scale offensive operations designed to seize, destroy, capture and inflict damage on personnel or materiel. 
Tactics used include the conduct of raids or ambushes, the placement of mines and other munitions, the use of 
standoff weapons, the provision of terminal guidance for precision guided munitions, and so on.
•	 Special recovery operations (Sro) are undertaken to rescue personnel or seize equipment from permissive, 
uncertain or hostile environments. They include domestic and offshore counterterrorism (CT) operations and 
non-combatant evacuation operations, as well as personnel recovery. For high-risk CT operations that are 
beyond the capability of civilian authorities, SOCOMD created so-called tactical assault groups (TAGs).
Within that mission set, there’s an operating profile that warrants separate discussion: Australia’s SOF involvement 
in clandestine operations, such as operations in support of intelligence or in other applications where there’s no 
declared Australian military involvement. 
It makes sense for SOF to be employed in this manner—they’re highly skilled and proficient in much of the tradecraft 
required. The Australian Government has few on-the-ground response options when managing crises or dealing 
with offshore security threats. In an international environment in which non-state actors are increasingly well 
armed and organised—and thus proportionately more dangerous—those sorts of special operations potentially 
will play a more important role. Media reporting—admittedly not always the most reliable source of information—
suggests that some clandestine operations have already been carried out abroad, with Australian soldiers operating 
out of uniform.8 
Such operations are by definition sensitive and frequently dangerous to the personnel involved. As such, they 
require close oversight. If the government sees continuing value in using SOF for clandestine operations, it would 
be critical to establish an unambiguous legislative framework. For example, it’s worth asking whether those special 
operations roles should be covered by amendments to the Defence Act or by separate legislation that sets out the 
prescribed and proscribed roles of any ADF elements involved and provides legal immunities for personnel involved 
similar to those provided by the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to staff of the Australian intelligence organisations.
Just as important as a legislative basis is the need for a well-developed appreciation of the sensitivities and 
potentially high risks of these sorts of operations, both in Defence and in government more widely. The potential 
costs and benefits need to be carefully weighed in ministerial and Cabinet deliberations, in much the same way they 
are for sensitive intelligence operations. 
The importance of the indirect approach
The political and public preoccupation with kinetic SOF missions shouldn’t obscure the fact that such operations 
are only the prerequisite for the ‘indirect approach’, which is critical in achieving a long-term effect of modern 
military operations. USSOCOM describes activities in this mission spectrum as focusing on: 
… empowering host nation forces, providing appropriate assistance to humanitarian agencies, and engaging 
key populations. These long-term efforts increase partner capabilities to generate sufficient security and rule 
of law, address local need, and advance ideas that discredit and defeat the appeal of violent extremism … One 
way [SOF achieve] this goal through the indirect approach is through forward and persistent engagement of 
key countries.9
The US Army uses the term ‘special warfare’ to point out that an indirect approach can also entail kinetic action and 
be conducted in permissive and hostile environments. Accordingly, special warfare is the: 
… execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and nonlethal actions taken by a specially trained 
and educated force that has a deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-unit 
tactics, and the ability to build and fight alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain, or 
hostile environment.10
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Arguably, the unifying theme behind both definitions is ‘political–military warfare, or shaping and influencing 
environments and populations’.11 
For Australia’s SOF, three missions fall into this category:
•	 Proxy and guerrilla warfare (PGW) focuses on training, advising and mentoring indigenous forces.
•	 Special shaping operations (SSo) include activities for ‘understanding the environment’ (UE), such as 
international engagement (training assistance, exercises etc.) and contingency planning activities. It also 
includes advanced force operations (AFO); that is, shaping and preparing the battlespace prior to the 
advancement of major operations, for example through clandestine and information operations (for instance, 
operations inside Iraq before the conventional campaign in March 2003).
•	 Specialist support (SS) is provided to other units of the ADF, non-military agencies or coalition forces. This 
includes operations such as protective security detachments, assistance for humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief (HADR), and counterproliferation and counter-narcotics operations. 
Concrete examples include working through and with partner forces, such as SOTG training of the Afghan National 
Security Forces or ‘partner capacity building’ in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. It’s highly likely that in the 
post-Afghanistan period those activities will become much more prevalent than direct, kinetic operations. 
Truths and myths about special operations forces
Because of their limited size and high demand, SOF are a scarce military resource that takes years to develop and 
that is perishable. Moreover, contrary to widespread perceptions, their operations usually don’t take place outside 
the general ADF framework; that is, there’s a symbiotic relationship with conventional forces. Five essential ‘truths’ 
about the SOF capability (sourced from USSOCOM, but applying beyond US forces) are worth keeping in mind:
1. Humans are more important than hardware. SOF ‘operators’ are ‘special’ in that they not only possess 
exceptional physical and psychological stamina, but are also ‘complex problem solvers’ with an ability for critical 
thinking, flexibility and ingenuity.
2. Quality is more important than quantity. Because of the high selection criteria and the focus on small-team 
operations, ‘small is beautiful’. In contrast, lowering entry standards can dilute special operations capability. The 
US military, for example, has had major problems in filling the ranks of its vastly expanded SOF with appropriate 
personnel. This is an especially important point if an increase in the ratio of SOF to regular Army is contemplated.
3. Sof can’t be mass produced. Because of their unique skills, SOF will of necessity constitute only a small 
portion of the total force. At the moment, the ratio of SOF to total Army size is about 1:14.
4. Sof capability can’t be quickly created after emergencies occur. While this is true for conventional 
capabilities as well, it’s particularly pertinent for SOF because of the long lead-times required for building up 
this capability.
5. Sof are critically dependent on support from conventional forces and other elements. As discussed in 
more detail below, all special operations capabilities, regardless of size, are dependent on critical enablers such 
as aviation and intelligence support, which are usually provided by conventional forces and other elements 
inside and outside Defence. 
We’d add another to the list: So are military operations that are bound by law. Despite the already mentioned 
need to strengthen the legal framework guiding special operations because they often occur at the ‘edge’ of existing 
policy and legal frameworks, Australia’s special operations capability is embedded into an institutional framework 
that provides for oversight and the application of rules of engagement. 
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The evolution of Australia’s special operations capability
Australia’s special operations capability has a long history, dating back to World War II when so-called ‘Independent 
Companies’ and the ‘M’ and ‘Z’ units of Special Operations Australia (SOA) operated as part of joint allied special 
forces behind Japanese lines in Southeast Asia. Following the end of the war, Australia’s ‘special action forces’ 
were based around the Special Air Service Regiment (SASR), 1st and 2nd Commando companies and 126th Signals 
Squadron. They were deployed on a number of operations, including during the Malayan Emergency and the 
Vietnam War. 
In 1979, Army created a small Directorate Special Action Forces—Army (DSAF-A) to improve the planning and 
coordination of special operations activities. The next step was the establishment of Headquarters Special Forces 
(HQSF) in 1990, with the role of commanding Australia’s SOF and providing advice on special operations capability 
and employment. The Commander Special Forces (ComdSF) was under the command of the Chief of General 
Staff (CGS) for the ‘raise, train and sustain’ functions. However, he answered directly to the Chief of the Defence 
Force (CDF) for the provision of advice and for the planning and conduct of operations. During the 1990s, further 
organisational changes were made, such as reassigning the HQ, SASR and 1st Commando Regiment (1 Cdo Regt) to 
Land Command, as well as renaming the HQ as Headquarters Special Operations (HQSO). 
A critical milestone in the recent development of the Australian special operations capability was the Howard 
government’s decision in 1998 to deploy a task force to Operation Pollard in Kuwait. The deployment demonstrated 
to government the value of the capability.12 Subsequently, SOF played significant roles in the 1999 East Timor 
operations and during the 2000 Sydney Olympics. These deployments paved the way for a much greater use of 
SOF in the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the US and in Australia’s subsequent operations in the 
greater Middle East. A SOTG formed the core of Australia’s initial military contribution to the war in Afghanistan 
in 2001 and 2002 and, following Canberra’s recommitment to Afghanistan in 2005, it conducted a range of 
counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. As well, a 500-strong SOTG assigned to Combined Joint Special Operations 
Task Force—West (CJSOTF-W) conducted a range of shaping operations in the opening stages of the 2003 Iraq War. 
SOF elements also operated in other places around the world alongside Australia’s allies and partners to disrupt 
terrorist networks and other irregular threats. 
This strategic environment led to a significant boost in the special operations capability. In 2003, the Howard 
government directed the establishment of the Special Operations Command (SOCOMD) as a joint command and 
equal in status to the environmental commands (Land, Air and Maritime commands). Led by a two-star commander 
(Special Operations Commander Australia, SOCAUST), its headquarters was renamed Special Operations 
Headquarters (SOHQ). In the context of the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, SOCOMD and its assigned units were 
allocated significantly more resources, bringing the number of its total personnel to about 2,200. 
The CDF, through the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), commands special operations through the capabilities 
provided by SOHQ (Figure 1). During operations, special operations force elements can be assigned to a commander 
of a joint task force. During peacetime, they’re assigned to SOCAUST, whose responsibilities include:
•	 developing special operations capabilities, including joint support capabilities
•	 undertaking contingency planning for special operations as directed
•	 planning and conducting special operations
•	 providing advice on the employment of SOF to strategic and operational level headquarters. 
Importantly, however, the Special Operations Commander Australia is responsible to the Chief of Army (CA) for the 
‘raise, train and sustain’ functions. 
Figure 2 shows the current special operations units assigned to SOHQ.
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In summary, Australia’s special operations capability has experienced a significant growth and institutional upgrade 
over the past couple of decades, owing to the changing strategic environment. However, it’s important to keep in 
mind that SOCOMD hasn’t been elevated to the level of a fully independent command with its own funding line and 
the like. 
Figure 1:   Australian special operations command and control arrangements
Figure 2:   Australia’s Special Operations elements (approximately 2,200 personnel)
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CHAPTER 3
The future tasks for Australia’s special operations capability
Despite the winding down of operations and uncertainty about the future security environment, the special 
operations capability will remain relevant for Australian governments in a number of areas, although most likely in 
different ways and with new priorities. The trend observed over the past two decades of military operations shifting 
towards low to medium intensity operations in a diverse range of environments means that SOF will continue to be 
of great utility to Western governments, including Australia’s. They can also play a significant role in an emerging 
Australian strategy that places greater emphasis on regional defence engagement. 
Wars are now frequently conducted ‘among the people’, meaning that an exclusive focus on classical military 
campaigns against other militaries is an increasingly obsolete concept.13 This isn’t to argue that military operations 
against conventional forces are a thing of the past or that regular land forces have lost their utility, but land forces 
need to be able to operate in scenarios that fall short of classical state-on-state conflicts. They’re likely to continue 
to face conventional and unconventional forces, irregular militias, paramilitaries, terrorist organisations and 
criminal networks, as well as hybrids. And, in any case, Australia’s land forces are simply not of a size to be able to 
contemplate a future based predominantly on large-scale conventional operations.
SOF are well suited to operate in this space. Yet, as the major operation in Afghanistan comes to an end (and with no 
immediate major follow-on operation in sight), SOF will need to place greater emphasis on being in a ‘supporting’ 
rather than ‘supported’ role. For example, they’ll increasingly support intelligence-led operations and assist security 
forces of partner countries. This has implications for the way they conduct operations and how they’re structured. 
Violent extremist networks and domestic counterterrorism
The fight against ‘violent extremist networks’ (VENs) was the driving force behind the significant upgrade of 
Australia’s special operations capability after 2001. In the wake of terrorist attacks around the Western world 
in the first part of the 2000s, the Howard government decided to enhance the capability of Australian SOF to 
conduct domestic CT operations. As part of this emphasis, in July 2002 a new tactical assault group (TAG) was 
established, based around the 2nd Commando Regiment in Sydney (TAG East) to conduct offensive CT operations, 
complementing TAG West based on the SASR in Perth. Special operations became an integral part of Australia’s 
CT architecture. In the process, SOCOMD enhanced its interactions with non-military CT stakeholders such as the 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), state police authorities and the intelligence services. SOCOMD also filled a CT role in 
the context of Australia’s engagement in the Middle East and Afghanistan through the offensive disruption of VENs 
and capacity building of host nations’ security forces.
With the Afghanistan operation winding down, it’s time to reassess the role of SOF in combating VENs and in 
domestic CT. The end of major operations in the Middle East and Afghanistan doesn’t mean that the threat posed by 
extremist terrorism and other irregular threats have disappeared. Rather, transnational VENs have shifted the bulk 
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of their activities from places such as Afghanistan to other, often more remote areas, particularly in Africa. However, 
it doesn’t necessarily follow that SOCOMD should invest in a specific capability to operate on the African continent, 
even as Australia’s business interests there grow. In the event of a hostage rescue operation, SOF elements could 
be deployed from domestic bases on short notice. Moreover, it appears more cost-effective to ‘burden-share’ 
with US and NATO SOF, both of which are already increasing their activities in Africa. A SOF contribution placed 
in USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM might be sufficient to utilise allied SOF nodes in the Middle East and Africa in 
a contingency. 
Instead, Australia’s primary contribution to an evolving allied SOF network to combat VENs should focus on 
increasing ties in Southeast and South Asia. In Southeast Asia, strengthening SOF ties with Indonesia, Malaysia and 
the Philippines is particularly important. In South Asia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are obvious candidates for closer 
cooperation; the latter is also important for Australia in disrupting people smuggling. 
For operations against extremists overseas, the area of operation won’t necessarily be a recognised area of conflict 
(as was the case in Afghanistan), and so won’t usually include a large presence of international conventional forces. 
That means that special operations activities will need to be conducted in small self-contained teams to allow for 
discreet and, if necessary, publicly deniable missions (for example, in the case of surgical strike). However, what it 
also means is that in most cases SOF elements won’t be able to rely on critical enablers provided by conventional 
forces. Therefore, unless a decision is made to develop such capabilities, Defence would need to secure allied or 
partner support; otherwise, the risk involved in such operations could be too high. 
When it comes to domestic CT, the special operations capability continues to be important as a response to a 
high-end terrorist attack on Australian soil. SOCOMD has developed a tight network with civilian authorities 
involved in domestic CT. Unless a decision is taken to improve the capabilities of the AFP and the states’ police 
services to upgrade their CT capability to deal with the highest spectrum of terrorist threats, this arrangement will 
be enduring. 
Post-Afghanistan, the preferred strategy of Western 
powers, Australia included, will be one of building 
capacity in other nations to reduce the need for security 
assistance and military employments. 
Strengthening regional engagement
The ADF’s current transition period provides an opportunity to refocus investment in regional and global SOF 
engagement activities. Post-Afghanistan, the preferred strategy of Western powers, Australia included, will be one 
of building capacity in other nations to reduce the need for security assistance and military employments. SOF will 
increasingly have to focus their activities on enabling partner countries to better address security problems within 
their own borders. As pointed out earlier, SOF are well suited for such ‘Phase Zero’ activities, which in the special 
operations space range from simple tactical-level training (marksmanship, radio operations and communications, 
medical training, small-unit tactics) to more sophisticated issues, such as increasing the professionalism of 
foreign militaries, security philosophies and institution building.14 As many countries in Southeast Asia and the 
South Pacific seek to enhance their military capabilities, SOF provides government with an option in a strategy to 
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selectively enhance regional defence diplomacy. The question is not if, but where and how, Australia’s SOF should 
intensify their international engagement. 
Despite debates about a global SOF network, it would make sense for Australia to focus on our near region—that’s 
where our security interests are most closely engaged and proximity would make it easier for other ADF elements 
to provide support for operations if required. That’s not to say that international efforts to increase global SOF 
networks are irrelevant for Australia’s special operations capability. As already mentioned, small SOCOMD 
contingents at USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM, as well as selective cooperation with NSHQ, are prudent investments 
to prepare for possible contingencies beyond the Asia–Pacific region. However, SOCOMD’s international 
engagement needs to be prioritised, given limited resources and because of Australia’s strategic priorities, which 
remain aimed at stability in our immediate neighbourhood, that is, the South Pacific and Southeast Asia. 
To strengthen SOCOMD’s international engagement, adequate resourcing is essential. That won’t be easy, since 
these activities often fail to receive the same degree of prioritisation from political and military leaders as direct, 
kinetic operations. Their immediate dividends are often less clear to policymakers, as they are ‘counter-intuitively 
characterized by slow and deliberate employment—long duration actions and activities, relationship establishment, 
development, and sustainment’.15 Particularly in Defence’s current fiscal environment, programs related to the 
indirect approach could be vulnerable to cuts despite their long-term benefits. Defence needs to ensure that 
SOCOMD remains adequately resourced to conduct more, not less, partner engagement. 
Another consideration is the future rationale behind SOF’s cooperation with Asia–Pacific nations. So far, regional 
defence engagement has focused mainly on counterterrorism, which in terms of allaying any concerns in the polity 
of both Australia and the partner country constitutes ‘low-hanging fruit’. Engagement on more traditional military 
roles is more sensitive, and engagement on the development of SOF capabilities even more so. Yet, as many of those 
countries aim to strengthen their capabilities in those areas, deeper engagement has the potential to provide high 
rewards, and SOCOMD’s engagement activities might need to be readjusted.
One area for engagement is contributing to partner 
nations’ general force generation through SOF activities. 
One area for engagement is contributing to partner nations’ general force generation through SOF activities. 
The US Joint Special Operations Task Force—Philippines (JSOTF-P) experience demonstrated this potential 
by improving the host nation’s airlift capability; between 2001 and 2007, US SOF training and advice helped to 
increase the readiness of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ helicopters from about 15% to 80%.16 Other areas 
for SOF cooperation with Southeast Asian countries include HADR—another low-hanging fruit area—as well as 
unconventional warfare and amphibious operations. However, if the Australian Government and Defence consider 
extending SOCOMD’s activities in these areas, they need to recognise that this kind of defence engagement could 
potentially be much more consequential, as many Southeast Asian countries remain wary of each other, seek to 
hedge against China’s maritime assertiveness, or both. 
Consequently, new engagements with some Southeast Asian countries should be considered very carefully. 
For example, despite the recent re-establishment of an Australian defence attaché in Myanmar, that country’s 
future path is still uncertain and SOF engagement could be detrimental to Australia’s interests. Likewise, 
building SOF ties with Vietnam could be difficult because of its domestic situation, despite the country’s growing 
regional importance. 
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SOCOMD should seek to intensify collaboration with counterparts from Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the 
Philippines. Strong ties with elements of Indonesia’s SOF, such as KOPASSUS, are of singular importance. The 
relationship between SOCOMD and KOPASSUS has experienced ups and downs and has sometimes been contested 
domestically in both countries, but strengthening the relationship is in Australia’s strategic interest.17 Increased 
cooperation with the other three countries, along with Indonesia, would not only be bilaterally beneficial but 
could also form the nucleus of possible multinational SOF cooperation in Southeast Asia. As is discussed in the 
next section, USSOCOM is aiming at the establishment of regional SOF coordination centres (RSCCs), including in 
the Asia–Pacific region. While it’s unclear whether this initiative will have financial and/or diplomatic support, a 
regional SOF training school—partly based on the NATO model—could be established in Australia or Southeast Asia 
as a testbed for greater cooperation. Defence could informally explore the potential with regional countries and 
offer SOCOMD expertise and participation. For example, Singapore could be a good location, given its geostrategic 
position in Southeast Asia. Alternatively, Australia could offer to host such a centre.
Close to home, apart from Indonesia, key emphasis should be on strengthening or developing SOCOMD’s presence 
in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Fiji. It’s quite conceivable that the PNG Government would be open to closer SOF 
engagement. And, provided this year’s Fijian election delivers a politically acceptable result, Defence should explore 
opportunities for SOF engagement—a move most likely to be welcomed by a government in Suva. 
Strengthening SOCOMD’s regional connectivity might require adjustments in its posture. One could be to establish 
regional command elements in Australian embassies to allow for a permanent country and/or regional SOF 
footprint. They would consist of longer term (two years plus) permanent SOCOMD representatives in key partner 
countries to provide in-country expertise and linkages to local authorities. Indonesia, PNG, Malaysia, Singapore 
and the Philippines are obvious candidates. Such ‘single operators’ would be able to acquire much deeper cultural 
familiarity and linguistic proficiency with SOCOMD’s regional and global partners. Furthermore, SOCOMD could 
build up its cohort of small teams, specialised in proxy and guerrilla warfare, and assign them with responsibility for 
key partner nations. 
Finally, SOCOMD should look for ways to increase its nascent engagement with Chinese SOF. This would provide 
some substance to the agreement between Australia and China on strengthening military-to-military relations. And 
our US ally would certainly welcome such interaction, given that ties between USSOCOM and its PLA equivalents are 
almost non-existent. SOCOMD’s interaction with Chinese SOF could therefore be an indirect alliance contribution. It 
should be noted that in 2011, Indonesian and Chinese SOF held their first training exercise, based on CT and special 
recovery operations18, indicating Beijing’s interest in greater international cooperation. 
Contribution to conventional and hybrid military operations
Despite their focus on unconventional threats and risks, Australia’s SOF also have a role to play in addressing 
hybrid conflict (for example, a collapse of North Korea) and conventional state-on-state conflicts, which can’t 
be discounted in the future. The future Asia–Pacific strategic environment requires a new degree of interaction 
between SOF and conventional forces. Many Asian countries (China foremost) are investing in anti-access/
area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in order to pose high risks to potential adversaries. If the Australian Government 
wants to retain the option to project military power in the face of such capabilities, either as part of allied 
operations or independently, it will rely on the ability of the ADF to operate in such non-permissive, denied 
operational environments.
SOF would play a key role in this context, either as ‘first entry’ forces as a precursor to follow-on forces or in a covert 
reconnaissance or strike role. To be effective in these roles, SOF will need well-developed capabilities to cooperate 
with conventional forces. The ADF’s current development of an amphibious capability, based on two Canberra-class 
amphibious assault ships (landing helicopter docks, LHDs), provides an excellent opportunity for such cooperation. 
The amphibious force will depend on an initial-entry force (in the case of a high-intensity operation) that can seize 
and hold an entry point long enough for the main forces to enter, or conduct a shaping operation before the landing 
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of the conventional force. One way to achieve that end is for the special operations element to be an integral part 
of the amphibious capability in terms of doctrine, training and equipment. Alternatively, SOF might be inserted by 
other means, especially if the initial environment isn’t suitable for the operation of large amphibious vessels. One 
such mechanism might be insertion via submarine, which will be in the cost–benefit mix for the Future Submarine 
(FSM) project. The specific capability requirements are discussed below under ‘Capability development’. 
Contributions to US coalition operations
Over the past decade, Australia’s special operations capability has been the Australian Government’s preferred 
instrument for contributing to the US alliance in the form of a small but highly valued force element. The US and 
its NATO allies speak highly of Australian SOF, particularly their professionalism and capability across most of the 
special operations spectrum, although they also note a lack of depth and shortfalls in some critical enablers. In turn, 
SOCOMD profited significantly from close cooperation with American SOF, particularly through access to critical 
enablers such as intelligence, in-theatre mobility and fire support in Afghanistan and elsewhere.
From a SOCOMD perspective, the key question is how to 
maintain the close linkage and the level of interoperability 
with its American counterparts as the operations in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East end. 
For the foreseeable future, Australia’s strategic policy will be centred on our close relationship with the US and, 
as suggested here, increasingly with regional counterparts. From a SOCOMD perspective, the key question is how 
to maintain the close linkage and the level of interoperability with its American counterparts as the operations in 
Afghanistan and the Middle East end. The recent decision in the US to increase the size of its SOF at a time when 
all other services are being cut shows the enduring value of a relationship between SOCOMD and its American 
counterpart. The US shift towards the Asia–Pacific provides opportunities to maintain and strengthen the 
relationship. USSOCOM already has a Special Operations Liaison Officer (SOLO) embedded in the US Embassy in 
Canberra.19 Furthermore, the agreement reached at the end of last year to establish a SOCOMD liaison position at 
US Pacific Command (USPACOM) in Hawaii demonstrates that steps are being taken to better coordinate the two 
allies’ SOF activities in the Asia–Pacific theatre. Finally, there’s value in maintaining linkages with USSOCOM through 
exchanges, training activities and the like.
However, in the post-Afghanistan era defence planners also face the question of what the implications are for 
Australia’s capacity to employ SOF without the critical enablers provided by allies. This particularly concerns 
contingencies in our immediate neighbourhood in which the US decides not to engage. In other words, Defence 
needs to prepare for the likelihood that the ‘luxury’ of SOF access to American enablers is not available and to plan 
to make up for resulting capability gaps.  
CHAPTER 4
Allied special operations forces 
Australia’s increase in special operations capability over the past decade reflected a similar trend in allied SOF. 
The US, in particular, significantly expanded its special operations capabilities. Further, the UK and Canada also 
improved their SOF capabilities. SOCOMD has a strong tradition of working with UK SOF, and Canada stood up 
an SOF command, providing some potential lessons for us to learn. Finally, closer ties with NATO’s new Special 
Operations Headquarters (NSHQ) were established in the context of Afghanistan. It’s noteworthy that many allied 
SOF face challenges very similar to those faced by Australia’s special operations capability. After rapid increases in 
personnel and financial resources, they’re also now subject to fiscal austerity measures and questions about their 
future utility and structure. While each country will have to make some decisions about the scale and role of their 
own sovereign capabilities, for coalition operations there’s scope for a cooperative approach to providing SOF. That 
might take the form of enhanced and expanded regional and global SOF networks, with shared connectivity and 
interoperability, allowing a collective reaction to a changing security environment. 
United States
US SOF play in a different league compared with other countries, including Australia. They’re probably the only SOF 
capable of operating across the whole spectrum of special operations because of their depth in manpower and 
other capabilities, which give them global reach. 
In 1987, the US consolidated separate service special operations capabilities into a single US Special Operations 
Command (USSOCOM)—a functional combatant command with a global area of responsibility. This four-star lead 
command now consists of four service SOF ‘components’, the Joint Special Operations Command and, since 2013, 
the seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) previously assigned to each of the seven US geographic 
commands. The TSOCs, while assigned ‘combatant command’ to the USSOCOM commander, remain under 
‘operational command’ of the relevant geographic combatant command. 
Moreover, a civilian Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict in the Pentagon 
is responsible for overseeing policy and resources related to special operations and for advising the Secretary of 
Defense on special operations. Since 2001, USSOCOM has experienced a massive increase in both personnel and 
money. It’s difficult to determine the exact number of personnel but, according to the US Congressional Research 
Service, USSOCOM end-strength increased from 36,000 in 2001 to ‘about 67,000 active duty, National Guard, and 
reserve personnel from all four services and DOD [Department of Defense] civilians’ in 2013.20 
The Pentagon’s stated goal is to raise that number to 70,000 during FY 2015, but it’s unclear whether enough 
financial resources will be made available. In line with the higher operational tempo and manpower increase, 
the USSOCOM budget increased from US$2.3 billion in 2001 to US$10.4 billion for FY 2013. There had been 
recent signs that pressure on the US defence budget was likely to affect USSOCOM funding: USSOCOM’s funding 
request for FY 2014 is US$9.9 billion (a 4% decrease)21, and the US Congress is demanding greater insight into the 
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USSOCOM budget.22 But the recent announcement of US defence spending adjustments provided something of an 
endorsement of the SOF with the announcement of a 5% increase in the size of US SOF by 3,700 troops, to a total of 
69,700.
As in Australia, US SOF became an instrument of choice for successive US administrations, as has been evident 
in USSOCOM’s increased end-strength and financial resources and its expanded responsibilities and authority. 
Moreover, to combat a complex nexus of transnational terrorism, insurgency and criminal networks, a premium had 
to be placed on a fusion between operations and intelligence, exemplified by the so-called ‘find, fix, finish, exploit, 
analyse and disseminate’ (F3EAD) approach.23 Indeed, one of the key lessons of Australia’s SOTG in Afghanistan has 
been the prevalence of intelligence-focused special operations missions to enable ‘evidence-based’ operations. 
However, US experts also point to an imbalance between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ activities in US SOF operations. 
The lion’s share of political attention and SOF resources went into kinetic, man-hunting missions, while critical and 
potentially more decisive non-kinetic activities were relegated to a status that some have described as little more 
than a ‘bumper sticker or a random engagement’.24 That might have been an appropriate weighting of activities 
for the specific circumstances in Afghanistan, but might not provide governments with the appropriate range of 
military options in a shifting operational environment that places a much greater emphasis on activities such as 
partner capacity-building and small-team operations in remote locations. 
To look at one example, the threat from VENs has mostly migrated from places such as Afghanistan to remote areas 
in Africa and the Middle East. In October 2013, for example, US SOF conducted simultaneous raids in Somalia and 
Libya.25 To combat VENs, these small-scale raids are often the tool of choice, as they can be mounted quickly and 
deployed without the large-scale (and slow) movement of forces required for conventional operations. Furthermore, 
in December 2013 the US also secretly sent a three-man advisory detachment to Somalia to assist a force of the 
African Union in operations against militants.26 In the future, SOF will operate more in a ‘grey area’ between war 
and peace, and will do so without a large presence of conventional forces from which to draw critical enablers 
such as logistics. They’ll also require timely intelligence support and might rely more on partner forces and their 
ability to conduct similar operations. Building partner capacity to enable them to provide for their own security 
will add depth to US and allied capabilities in environments where access is limited and where their comparative 
technological advantage is being eroded. 
From a US perspective, the growing focus on more non-kinetic SOF missions also applies to the Asia–Pacific region. 
In this context, the US JSOTF-P is widely regarded as a model for future SOF partner engagement. Starting in 2002, a 
US SOF contingent successfully trained, advised and assisted the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine 
National Police to grow their CT and COIN capability. JSOTF-P also worked closely with non-military agencies to 
conduct wide-ranging humanitarian and development assistance missions in rural areas of the country. A full-time 
SOF officer assigned to the US Embassy in Manila allowed for close cooperation and interagency interaction.27 
While it remains to be seen whether the JSOTF-P model can be replicated in other countries28, the increased 
emphasis on partner engagement is likely to lead to adjustments in US SOF structure. This includes the 
development of additional ‘single operators’ and small-unit teams with specialised knowledge and networks in 
pivotal partner countries. While language skills and cultural awareness are important parts of special operations in 
general, the aim would be to deploy operators for much longer periods (two years plus) in designated countries to 
allow more substantial networks and expertise to evolve. 
Finally, USSOCOM has pushed for the expansion of the ‘Global SOF Network’ (GSN). To achieve this objective, it 
wants to improve partnerships with regional SOF, including those of Australia. Apart from enhancing its Theater 
Special Operations Commands, USSOCOM proposes the establishment of regional SOF coordination centres 
(RSCCs), including in the Asia–Pacific region. However, at this point it’s unclear whether the RSCC concept stands 
much chance of being implemented. There’s been a lot of push-back in the US Congress, not least because of 
the additional funding required. Congress has already proposed to reduce funding for some GSN activities, and 
USSOCOM has been directed to develop a ‘resource neutral’ plan to develop the GSN.29
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Regardless, as discussed in the previous section, Australia has a vital interest in maintaining and improving the ties 
between SOCOMD and US SOF. 
United Kingdom 
The formation of the UK’s special operations capability dates back to World War II and the commando operations 
of the British Army’s Special Air Service (SAS) against the German Afrika Korps in North Africa. During the Cold War, 
the SAS was (among other units) deployed on operations in Southeast Asia, Africa and Northern Ireland. In 1987, 
the SAS and the Special Boat Service (SBS) were drawn together into a unified command (known as UKSF), based 
around the Director Special Forces. During the 1990s, they were deployed on all major British operations, including 
in Iraq, the Balkans and East Timor. 
Just as in Australia and elsewhere, UK SOF received a major boost after 2001 and the operations in Afghanistan 
and Iraq. They became an independent, operational-level component command, alongside Air, Maritime and Land 
elements in the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and in the deployable Joint Task Force Headquarters. The 
Director Special Forces was upgraded from one-star to two-star level. The UK SOF has tripled in size since 2004 
to approximately 3,500 personnel (including support staff) and has been prioritised for funding and equipment. 
Further steps to upgrade the capability included:
•	 the expansion of the SAS Signals Squadron to battalion size
•	 the formation of a special reconnaissance regiment (18 Signal Regiment) in 2004 to provide the SAS with 
dedicated intelligence
•	 the establishment of a Joint Special Forces Support Group (a Ranger-style battalion based on the First Battalion, 
Parachute Regiment)
•	 more unified and larger special operations capability through closer cooperation between the SAS and the 
Special Boat Service 
•	 the creation of an organic Joint Special Forces Air Wing, including the 8 Flight Army Air Corps, 657 Squadron 
of the Royal Air Force (RAF), 7 Squadron (RAF) and 47 Squadron (RAF), which provide rotary- and fixed-wing 
strategic and tactical mobility.30
However, UK SOF now face a much tighter fiscal environment, and in early 2013 media reports indicated the 
possibility of deep cuts in the capability.31 However, apparently those plans haven’t been implemented. This reflects 
a trend in many Western armed forces, particularly in Western Europe: the steady reduction of armies since the 
end of the Cold War has led to a concentration of resources when it comes to land forces. While the regular army in 
the UK and elsewhere has been reduced, high-value assets like SOF have increased in size, resource allocation and 
strategic importance.32 
Canada
Canada’s SOF also have a long tradition, dating back to World War II. Canada’s involvement in Afghanistan, like 
Australia’s, led to an increase in its special operations capability. In 2006, a new Canadian Special Operations 
Command (CANSOFCOM) was established. It comprises five key units: a Joint Task Force 2 (JTF 2), which is a CT 
and special operations unit predominantly for overseas deployments; the Canadian Special Operations Regiment 
(CSOR), which provides tactical support to the JTF 2; the 427 Special Operations Aviation Squadron (SOAS); the 
Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit; and the Canadian Special Operations Training Centre (CSOTC).33 
From an Australian perspective, two issues are particularly noteworthy. First, Canada is also a member of the 
‘Five Eyes’ community (along with the US, the UK, Australia and New Zealand), and the Canadian and Australian 
SOF organisations have worked well together in the past. Indeed, as Canada seeks to increase its strategic role in 
the Asia–Pacific, there could be scope for deeper cooperation in this space.34 Second, apparently the Canadian 
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Government established a capability manager (CM) to manage organic SOF capability. While we can’t make a 
judgement on whether that works in the Canadian context, a similar model could be considered in Australia.
New Zealand
The New Zealand special operations capability is the smallest among the Five Eyes, commensurate with the 
modest size of the New Zealand Defence Force. The capability is based on a regiment (five squadrons) of the New 
Zealand Special Air Service Regiment (NZSAS). In 2005, a dedicated CT squadron (D Squadron—Commando) was 
established. It’s been deployed regionally and globally, including in East Timor, Bougainville and Afghanistan. In 
some of those deployments, the NZSAS has been repeatedly incorporated in missions alongside Australian SOF. 
There’s also an established exchange between the two organisations. In the future, this relationship could grow in 
importance as the ADF develops its amphibious capability to better deal with contingencies in the South Pacific. 
This area is the primary operating environment for the New Zealand Defence Force, and SOF elements from both 
countries could be called upon to work together in an amphibious operation to evacuate Australian and New 
Zealand nationals during a crisis. NZSAS personnel should therefore be tightly integrated in the ADF’s amphibious 
capability development through joint planning, exercises and the like. 
NATO
Largely in the context of the Afghanistan operation, Australia has intensified its relationship with the NATO 
alliance.35 This included cooperation between the SOCOMD/SOTG and NATO’s new Special Operations Headquarters 
(NSHQ), which was established in June 2007 and redesignated with that name in March 2010. In line with the trend 
outlined above, one factor behind the new organisation was the need to come to terms with declining allied defence 
budgets and the appreciation that SOF offer an effective and relatively cost-effective capability.36
Currently led by a US commander, NSHQ reports directly to the Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe 
(SACEUR) for tasking and prioritisation. While it currently consists of approximately 220 personnel from the 
26 member countries, there are plans for an increase in strength. NSHQ’s mission is to be the ‘primary point 
of development, coordination and direction for all NATO Special Operations-related activities’.37 It works with 
allies and partners to coordinate deployment and increase interoperability through standardisation and NATO’s 
Battlefield Information Collection and Exploitation Systems (BICES). NATO has also established a Special Forces 
School at Chievres Air Base in Belgium.
It’s NATO’s goal to further enhance its SOF network and to 
establish a ‘federation of SOF training centres’. Australia is 
seen as a key partner in this regard...
It’s NATO’s goal to further enhance its SOF network and to establish a ‘federation of SOF training centres’.38 Australia 
is seen as a key partner in this regard, as outlined by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during his 
2012 visit to Australia.39 As a result, there could be new opportunities for SOCOMD and NSHQ to collaborate beyond 
Afghanistan as part of an increasingly strong Global SOF Network, particularly since NSHQ is very much driven by 
the US. Given geostrategic proximity, it’s plausible that one key operational focus of NATO SOF will be Africa, which 
is also an area of increasing interest for Australia, as recognised in Australia’s Defence White Paper 2013.40 It’s also 
noteworthy that USSOCOM has identified NSHQ as a role model of SOF cooperation41; some of its structures might 
be useful in efforts to set up similar institutions in the Asia–Pacific region. 
CHAPTER 5
Capability development
While SOF are capable of acting independently in some circumstances, there are many situations in which they 
depend on other force elements for transport, intelligence fusion, communications connectivity (including for 
command and control), fire support and logistics. Operations in the Afghanistan theatre saw Australia’s SOF rely 
heavily on allied assets, particularly tactical aviation. This worked well enough, primarily because the US was in 
the lead in the operation and had a large number of assets in theatre. But that’s not guaranteed to be the case in 
all circumstances, especially in Australia’s near region, where our national interests are likely to be more highly 
engaged than American ones.
As well, the hybrid operations described above may require SOF to operate seamlessly with other ADF and, 
potentially, allied force elements. For example, SOF operating in support or advance of amphibious operations will 
need lift into theatre in the first instance, and will subsequently be required to at least communicate with other land 
and naval elements to coordinate follow-on landings. They might also need to coordinate indirect fire support or 
air strikes.
Together, these requirements raise a number of policy questions:
•	 Which capabilities should be organic to the SOF, and which should reside elsewhere?
•	 How are the capabilities required by the SOF to be raised, trained and sustained?
•	 How will Australia’s SOF maintain the high levels of interoperability with allied (especially American) forces that 
have developed over the past decade?
There are no hard and fast answers to these questions. Like all other questions in capability development and 
force preparedness, they depend critically upon judgements made by government about the roles envisaged for 
the ADF in general and the SOF in particular, and on the resources made available. Generally, a greater allocation 
of resources results in a higher level of capability that can be raised and sustained. Similarly, allocating greater 
resources to SOF to enable them to maintain a wide range of organic capabilities would reduce uncertainty in 
planning and make for seamless operations. But it would also come at an opportunity cost elsewhere in the Defence 
Capability Plan.
Therefore, a degree of judgement is needed to determine ‘how much is enough’ where resources are concerned 
and about how self-sufficient the SOF should be. However, a few general principles can be used to guide 
decision-making, and some organisational changes would help to identify mission-critical gaps that would benefit 
from higher priority in the capability development process.
First, it makes sense for assets that are frequently used in mission-critical ways to be held organically by the SOF. It 
would simply be inefficient to have to constantly coordinate the availability of those assets, which wouldn’t usually 
be available for other tasking in any event. However, that list probably doesn’t extend much beyond personal 
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equipment and weaponry, specialised equipment such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
gear, and basic mobility vehicles. Perhaps counterintuitively, the versatility of SOF tends to work against their 
holding large quantities of materiel. Holding all of the equipment required to perform all of the assigned tasks would 
be prohibitively costly in both money and the personnel who would be involved in sustaining it. 
Second, there’s an economy of scale if equipment is maintained as part of the wider ADF fleet. For example, 
maintaining even a small number of helicopters within SOCOMD would incur substantial fixed costs and bring with 
it difficulties in ensuring availability with a small fleet. Again, this tends to argue against organically embedding 
enabling capability within SOCOMD. That said, given that the SOF are among the ADF elements most likely to be 
committed to a high-risk operation at short notice, the preparedness and capability of the necessary support 
elements have to be managed carefully to avoid unnecessary operational risks.
A Special Operations Capability Manager?
One way to manage the capabilities that have to come together in special operations would be to have a capability 
manager responsible for ensuring that all of the elements are fit for purpose and available with reasonable notice. 
That naturally raises the question of whether SOCOMD needs its own capability manager. Of course, any such 
organisational solution needs to work well within the wider Defence capability management framework.
Defence’s solution for the development and delivery of capability is the capability manager (CM) framework. CMs 
have the responsibility to raise, train and sustain forces. In short, they’re tasked with providing the government 
of the day with the military options that have been identified in government policy guidance, consistent with the 
resources available. 
CMs have a role in both the development of future capability and the management of existing resources. In the 
development of future capability (either new capabilities or the enhancement of existing ones), they’re responsible 
for both defining the user need and developing a proposal for consideration by government that takes into account 
the coordination of the fundamental inputs to capability (FICs), which include logistics, training, doctrine, personnel 
and so on. 
Currently, there are only four CMs: 
•	 Chief of Navy (CN), for maritime capability
•	 Chief of Army (CA), for land capability
•	 Chief of Air Force (CAF), for aerospace capability
•	 Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Security (DEPSEC I&S), for Defence intelligence agencies capability.
The ‘easiest’ solution for SOCOMD’s requirement for the coordination of enabling and support force elements would 
be to stand up a CM for special operations. However, there are arguments against that. For a start, it’s sensible 
to limit the number of CMs. Defence’s committee processes already have a large number of stakeholders and the 
result is time-consuming process and a lack of clear responsibility. As well, SOCOMD isn’t the only ADF force element 
to have critical dependencies on others—there are many others in a similar position. Having a large number of 
CMs would result in a messy set of overlapping responsibilities, and the likely outcome would be a framework in 
which accountability is diffused to the point of being meaningless. That’s why, for example, there aren’t separate 
managers for submarines and surface combatants; those maritime elements are managed as part of an overall 
naval capability, and the Chief of Navy has the ability to move resources between the force elements depending on 
the guidance he receives from government and from the Chief of the Defence Force’s preparedness directive.
Most of the SOF roles are fundamentally in land operations (although they can also influence and enhance 
operations in other domains), and almost all of the personnel in SOCOMD are drawn from the wider Army. The 
current capability management arrangement in which the Chief of Army is responsible for land operations more 
broadly doesn’t seem, a priori, to be the wrong solution. The Chief of Army is responsible for managing the Army’s 
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materiel and personnel, including many of the enablers for special operations, such as vehicles, rotary-wing 
transport and fire support. He’s also responsible for ensuring that the interfaces between the Army and the other 
services required for joint operations are fit for purpose. 
It might be argued that the specialised nature of SOF requirements makes it prohibitively difficult for the Chief 
of Army to manage special operations capability in addition to the rest of his portfolio, but that argument would 
apply to other force elements as well. Submarine operations are highly specialised and often sensitive, dangerous, 
or both, and the interfaces between submarines and other ADF and national elements need to be managed 
carefully. Similarly, air combat operations are highly specialised and sometimes need to be tightly coordinated 
with land and surface forces. In other words, the capability management requirements of SOF are an example 
of a wider issue within Defence: the management of those capabilities required to ‘join up’ the predominantly 
single-service elements.
So perhaps the best solution, not just for SOCOMD but for other ADF force elements as well, is for the ADF to 
stand up an additional CM for Joint Capabilities, responsible for ensuring that the capabilities required for the 
ADF to operate jointly are in place and managed across the force elements that have to work together. The new 
CM would be responsible for ensuring that C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities were coordinated across the services, and that the enabling and 
support capability required by specialised force elements are appropriately managed and developed. In this model, 
SOCOMD’s requirements would be considered and prioritised along with those of other ADF elements. Such a 
move would be consistent with trends elsewhere; the UK and Canada both have appointments responsible for joint 
capability development. It would also provide a natural home for the development of plans such as the C4ISR and 
antisubmarine warfare roadmaps.
The counter-argument is likely to be that the existing capability development process is already joint, with 
Capability Development Group (CDG) already staffed by tri-service and civilian personnel. That’s true: the ADF’s 
jointness has noticeably improved over the past few years, and the roadmaps mentioned above were developed 
without a CM for Joint Capabilities. But there are also signs that there’d be value in formalising a champion of joint 
capabilities within the process. 
The current Defence Capability Plan (DCP) is showing signs of strain, and the ‘big four’ projects—Joint Strike 
Fighter, Future Submarine, LAND 400 (protected mobility vehicles for land forces) and future frigates—have been 
described by the Head of CDG as being of a size that has ‘the potential to distort the force structure’. In such an 
environment, having a voice at the table for the joint capabilities that have to be developed and funded in what’s 
bound to be a restrained DCP for at least the next few years (and probably well beyond) would give the best chance 
of realising synergies between predominantly single-service items. It would be a way of making sure that the sort 
of coordination required by SOCOMD and other force elements that have non-organic critical enablers is given 
appropriate consideration in the capability development process.
This is a particularly important time for the development of joint capabilities. The ADF’s future amphibious 
capability will arguably require more jointness than any predecessor, and SOCOMD will necessarily have an 
important role to play in that as well. The two prime candidates for the role of CM Joint Capabilities are the Vice 
Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) and the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS). There are pros and cons for each: 
CJOPS has the most immediate awareness of current strengths and weaknesses in joint operations, but the 
demands of current operations might limit their ability to look towards future possibilities. VCDF is well placed to do 
the latter, but isn’t as intimately involved in making the ADF work in a joined-up way from day to day. Nonetheless, 
the central organisational position of VCDF in the senior defence committee structure makes that position the 
natural actor for such a role. CJOPS would then become a source of expert advice to VCDF in identifying current 
shortfalls and developing trends in joint operations.
To be clear, we’re not proposing that the responsibility to raise, train and sustain the land forces—of which the SOF 
are a component—should move away from Chief of Army, any more than the other Chiefs relinquish the capabilities 
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they are now responsible for. In our model the new CM Joint Capabilities should be responsible for those elements 
of materiel and FICs required to realise synergies between force elements under the responsibility of the extant CMs.
Funding special operations capabilities
It’s fair to say that the SOF provide very good ‘bang for the buck’ at the moment and are still far from being in the 
realm of diminishing returns—meaning that some judicious additional funding could give a proportionally high 
return on investment. And, if the expanded role that SOCOMD has played recently continues to be the default (or is 
expanded even further), some extra capitalisation is likely to be required.
Given the specialised nature of the capability, SOCOMD itself is best placed to make small-scale investment 
decisions and to guide experimental work on developing future capability. In the same way that other specialist 
organisations, such as the Australian Signals Directorate, have a capability development budget that’s managed in 
house, an ongoing funding line for SOCOMD that allows it to use resources in a discretionary way would be likely to 
give a better (and more efficient) return than requiring it to go through more elaborate processes within the Army or 
beyond. The appropriate quantum of funding is hard to identify from outside, but it should probably be at least the 
size of several minor projects—perhaps $20–30 million per year. 
But for larger projects, the benefit to SOCOMD has to be balanced against the opportunity cost elsewhere in the 
Defence portfolio, and there’s no compelling reason to prioritise SOCOMD over the rest of the ADF. Provided that 
the requirements of SOCOMD are appropriately factored into the capability development process along with the 
estimated costs and benefits, the process should be able to prioritise appropriately—especially if there’s a CM Joint 
Capabilities to make the case, as recommended here. In any event, it’s likely that the value-add of SOCOMD will 
often make the gaining of priority relatively easy.
The human dimension
Finally, it’s important to consider the human dimension of Australia’s special operations capability. The first 
aspect is the size of the SOF. Unless the Australian Government wants to significantly increase the scope of special 
operations activities (and we don’t see a compelling reason for this in the near to medium term), the current 
end-strength of SOCOMD seems about right. Given the current fiscal realities and the lower tempo of operations, it’s 
difficult to argue for an increase in SOF personnel. Moreover, the inherent challenges in recruiting highly specialised 
‘operators’ puts a limit on the pool of suitable candidates. However, we’d also argue against cutting the special 
operations capability. It takes years to build specific capabilities, and Australia’s relatively small SOF could easily be 
disrupted as a result of personnel reductions. 
A possible challenge for future special operations recruitment could emerge if a decision is made to downsize 
the regular Army, which is the key pool for recruiting SOF candidates. Should it be subjected to manpower cuts, 
it’s reasonable to expect that the Army would be reluctant to ‘lose’ more of its most capable people to SOCOMD. 
Consequently, the Army leadership and SOCOMD need to think about the best ways to manage SOF recruitment and 
sustainment under personnel and budgetary pressures. 
SOCOMD could also experience what the former Commander USSOCOM, Admiral Eric Olson, has called the problem 
of a ‘fraying’ force. That is, a consistently high tempo of special operations has placed significant stress on those 
SOF who served in Iraq and Afghanistan and their families, creating challenges for retaining US SOF beyond 
Afghanistan.42 For SOCOMD, the ‘fraying’ challenge could be somewhat different. With a decrease in high-intensity 
operations and a greater shift towards the non-kinetic special operations mission spectrum, experienced operators 
might decide to leave the force. While some retirement of personnel is inevitable, SOCOMD needs to think creatively 
about opportunities to expose seasoned operators to highly demanding activities outside real operations. One 
possibility is for SOF operators to participate regularly in high-level exercises with allied SOF, particularly USSOCOM. 
CHAPTER 6
Recommendations
Over the past decade, the Australian special operations capability has proven to be a major asset for the Australian 
Government. Looking to the future, we make the following recommendations.
consolidate the Sof capability at existing levels. Because SOCOMD received significant resource investments 
over the past decade, particularly in proportion to the regular Army, there could be a temptation to cut back the 
special operations capability on the grounds that the post-Afghanistan period won’t require such a strong focus 
on unconventional military operations. However, SOCOMD is a very small organisational element within Defence 
and would be disrupted by even minor changes. Moreover, its specific skill set, developed over the years, is likely to 
become more, not less, important in the new strategic environment. Finally, particularly in a resource-constrained 
environment, SOCOMD offers government a relatively cost-effective option. The government and the Defence 
leadership should resist attempts to cut the special operations capability.
Provide SocoMD with an ongoing funding line for specialised, small-scale capability projects. Given the 
specialised nature of the capability, SOCOMD itself is best placed to make small-scale investment decisions and to 
guide experimental work on developing future capability. In the same way that other specialist organisations, such 
as the Australian Signals Directorate, have a capability development budget that’s managed in house, an ongoing 
funding line for SOCOMD that allows it to use resources in a discretionary way would be likely to give a better 
(and more efficient) return than requiring it to go through more elaborate processes within the Army or beyond. 
The appropriate quantum of funding should probably be at least the size of several minor projects—perhaps 
$20–30 million per year. For larger projects, no SOF-specific funding line seems required. 
establish an ADf capability Manager for Joint capabilities. The ADF should consider standing up a Capability 
Manager for Joint Capabilities who is responsible for ensuring that C4ISR capabilities are coordinated across the 
services, and that the enabling and support capabilities required by specialised force elements are appropriately 
managed and developed. In the SOCOMD case, Chief of Army would retain the responsibility to raise, train and 
sustain the land forces, while the new Capability Manager would be responsible for ensuring that the materiel and 
enablers required to realise synergies between SOCOMD and other ADF elements were in place.
This would enable SOCOMD’s special capability requirements to be considered and prioritised along with those of 
other ADF elements. The Vice Chief of the Defence Force is best suited for this new position. 
establish an unambiguous legislative framework for clandestine operations. In the future strategic 
environment, clandestine operations, which involve military personnel in ways other than uniformed and declared 
military operations, could become more important for Australia’s SOF. If the government decides to use SOCOMD in 
this way, we need an unambiguous legislative framework and robust oversight mechanisms.
enhance Sof regional engagement through regional liaison elements. While conducting high-value kinetic 
operations will continue to be a core SOF mission, the next decade is likely to see a greater shift towards the 
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‘indirect’ approach of special operations. Engagement with partner nations in our region and beyond will become 
more important. This development should be reflected in the SOF posture. One step could be to establish regional 
special operations liaison elements in selected Australian embassies to enable a permanent country and/or 
regional SOF footprint. These would be longer term (two years plus) permanent SOCOMD placements in key partner 
countries to provide in-country expertise and linkages to local authorities.
Prioritise and intensify Sof cooperation in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australia’s SOF engagement 
should prioritise our near region. That’s where our security interests are most closely engaged, and proximity would 
make it easier for other ADF elements to provide support for operations if required. In Southeast Asia, Defence could 
establish SOF regional liaison elements in Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. The SOF relationship 
with Indonesia is the most important and should be prioritised.
Initiate the establishment of a regional Sof training centre. Greater SOF cooperation with Southeast Asian 
countries could lay the groundwork for the establishment of a regional SOF training centre in a Southeast Asian 
country or Australia. Modelled on NATO’s Special Forces School, the centre could facilitate cooperation and 
coordination among regional SOF as a contribution to cooperative security in the region. It could also link into 
existing training centres beyond the Asia–Pacific region. Defence could initiate a dialogue with regional partner 
countries on the feasibility of such an undertaking. 
Maintain and strengthen cooperation and linkages with US Sof. Cooperation between SOCOMD and USSOCOM 
is critical for Australia’s security interests and is highly likely to continue, whether in the Asia–Pacific region 
or further abroad. Moreover, Australia’s SOF have benefited significantly from access to US SOF activities and 
capabilities. The task is to maintain a similar degree of cooperation. The US ‘pivot’ to our region provides a good 
vehicle to do so, as US SOF will very likely intensify their activities in the Asia–Pacific region. It will be important 
to ensure that Australian and US SOF activities in the Asia–Pacific theatre are well coordinated. SOCOMD should 
establish a permanent presence at USAFRICOM and USCENTCOM to facilitate possible operations in Africa and the 
Middle East. 
Intensify cooperation with chinese Sof. Defence should promote cooperation between SOCOMD and its Chinese 
counterpart. This would be a confidence-building measure in Australia–China military-to-military relations as 
well as a burden-sharing contribution to the US alliance. Exercises related to counterterrorism and humanitarian 
assistance and disaster relief would be well suited for this purpose. 
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